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Abstract 
The issue of the nature of the altruism inherent in blood donation and the perverse effects of 
financial rewards for blood and/or organ donation has been recently revisited in the economic 
literature with limited consensus. As Titmuss (1970) famously pointed out, providing 
monetary incentives to blood donors may crowd out blood supply as purely altruistic donors 
may feel less inclined to donate if a reward is involved – in addition to having the effect of 
reducing blood quality. In this paper we examine how favouring different types of incentives 
are related to the likelihood of donating blood by exploiting a large sample representative of 
the population of fifteen European countries in 2002 containing information on both donation 
and attitudes towards incentives. Our results show those who have donated are less likely to 
favour monetary rewards for blood donation but are more likely to favour non-monetary 
ones. This is consistent with the idea that while monetary rewards may crowd out blood 
donation, non-monetary rewards do not. 
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1 Introduction
There is increasing interest in the motivation of altruistic behaviour, not merely for the
sake of exploring behavioural drives which go beyond classical axioms of self-interest to
explain individual behaviour, but more recently as a means of correcting government
interventions which are held to crowd out individual actions. For example, the current
UK government has advocated the notion of a big societywhich, although rather
unclearly dened, appears to have altruistic behaviour as a central theme. While there
is much loose-talk centred around the denition of this policy tool, there is a growing
interest in whether such behaviour can be motivated through incentive mechanisms.
There has thus been interest in nudging behaviour towards pre-specied outcomes
such as tackling health inequalities, preventing ill-health, improving health outcomes
and spreading information and good health advice (Department of Health, 2011).
Possibly one of the most long-lasting and discussed examples of behaviour broadly
consistent with this notion of core altruistic behaviour is individual blood donation.
One donated unit of whole blood can save up to three lives but donated blood
has a short shelf life. Regular donors are therefore essential to secure a constant
supply. In 1997, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended that all blood
donations should come from unpaid voluntary donors. However, by 2006, only 49
of 124 countries surveyed had established this as a standard. Furthermore, in the
WHOs European region the number of donors varies from less than 4.5 to over 45
per 1000 population. Only 39 per cent of the general population are eligible to donate,
and fewer than 5 per cent of those eligible actually donate.
Individuals might undertake certain altruistic actions guided by an extrinsic mo-
tivation, including a warm-glowor moral satisfaction. Blood donation has often been
seen as a clear-cut example of altruism with non-monetary pay-o¤s(Elster, 1990).
Nevertheless, the issue of the nature of the altruism inherent in blood donation is
yet to be agreed upon in the economic literature. Cooper and Culyer (1968) argue
that competition and monetary incentives would be suitable to motivate donors but
Titmuss (1970) famously points out that providing incentives to blood donors may
crowd out blood supply as purely altruistic donors may feel less inclined to donate
if a reward is involved. Solow (1971) and Arrow (1972) discuss this proposition and
suggest that the e¤ects of price incentives can simply be added to those of altruistic
donation, and hence if the price of blood is raised, the quantity o¤ered would increase
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in accordance with a supply function. However, the question of the e¤ects of monet-
ary incentives on altruistic behaviour has remained unanswered and the phenomenon
discussed by Titmuss was coined as motivation crowd-out. Trying to answer the ques-
tion of whether altruistic behaviour can be incentivised, Frey and Jegen (2001), Frey
and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), and Benabou and Tirole (2006) point out that intrinsic
motivation may go unnoticed if a payment is o¤ered.
In this paper, we explore whether nancial and non-nancial incentives are as-
sociated to willingness to donate when other observed and unobserved factors are
controlled for. We answer this question by exploiting a large dataset representat-
ive of fteen European countries containing information on both whether or not an
individual has been a donor in the past and her preferences towards monetary and
non-monetary compensation for blood donation. This information allows estimation
of two recursive equation systems and exploration of the association of preferences
for di¤erent types of rewards (attitudes) and the probability of being a donor.
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis of blood supply crowding out due
to monetary incentives in all European countries. But, most importantly, we nd
no evidence of potential crowding out when non-monetary rewards are involved in
most European countries. These results are robust to di¤erent specications and are
coherent with the idea that crowding out is a phenomenon linked to the introduction
of a market based rationale for non-market decisions, and that socially motivated
individuals remain willing to donate when non-monetary rewards are o¤ered.
Our results conrm and generalise recent ndings that monetary and non-monetary
rewards may not crowd out donation as long as self-interest is removed from them
(Mellstrom and Johannesson, 2008; Lacetera and Macis, 2010a, 2010b). The con-
tribution of our present work to the extant literature is threefold. First, we use a
large dataset representative of fteen European countries containing both attitudes
towards incentives for blood donation and past donation behaviour as opposed to
smaller and/or experimental samples on donors only. Second, because of that, we
can directly analyse the relationship of the respondentspreferences for monetary and
non-monetary rewardswith the probability of being a donor. Further, by using a
sample representative of fteen countries, we can control for ethnic, cultural and in-
stitutional variations. Third, our results are consistent with the idea that altruistic
behaviour can be incentivised as long as the rewards do not conceal the identity of
the blood giver as a donor.
2
The next section provides some background on altruism and blood donation; sec-
tion 3 describes our econometric model; section 4 discusses the results; and section 5
concludes.
2 Background
We rst present some background on the motivation behind blood donation as an
act of gift-giving and, more specically, how it relates to di¤erent forms of socially
motivated acts including altruism. We then discuss how the literature on blood
donation addresses the question of providing incentives for altruistic behaviour.
2.1 Blood Donation and Social Motivation
Blood donation has been classied as an act of collective gift-giving(Mercier Ythier,
2006). Donating blood is a pro-social act in the sense that donors incur individual
costs in exchange for a collective benet and contributes to ensuring the blood supply
system works well.
In economic terms, blood donation, as any other donation or charitable act, is
an economic voluntary transfer that traditionally has not been motivated by market
exchange. It implies some form of economic sacrice by the giver in exchange for the
receiversbenet for which the giver expects no return. Moreover, since gift-giving
individuals, or knights in the terminology of Le Grand (1997, 2003), ought to care
about the receiversutility rather than their own pure self-interest, theoretically it is
envisaged as an act immune to strategic behaviour of giving agents towards the givers
(Kolm, 2000). Nevertheless, some forms of altruistic behaviour take place partially
as a result of a feeling of dutytowards others (Etzioni, 1988), from the imitation
of othersbehaviours especially of those individuals signalled as reference groups;
from a feeling of social or moral indebtedness having been or expecting to be on
the receiving end on another occasion; or, even from identity driven self-interested
motivations (e.g., to attain a feeling of being a good person) as we argue in this paper.
Empirically, most blood donors will give some altruistic reason for giving, often
citing feelings of community attachment or some commitment to the common good
as their motive (Healy, 2000). The latter paves the way for the development of an
identity as an altruist, which can be substantiated by a continuous act of blood
donation or not. Hence, blood donation can be considered a manifestation of impure
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altruism, insofar as donors receive a direct moral satisfaction for their act beyond that
attributable to having contributed to the collective benet. In that sense, Wildman
and Hollingsworth (2009) examine the type and timing of blood donations between
new and established donors. They nd no evidence that 0-negative donors (i.e., the
universal blood group compatible with all blood types and hence more valuable for
donation) donate more, suggesting no evidence of pure altruism. More precisely, in
some forms of impure altruism such as blood donation agents are said to receive a
warm-glow payo¤ by taking an action they believe to be virtuous (Andreoni, 1990).
More recently, Stutzer et al. (2011) provide evidence form a eld experiment with
the Swiss red cross suggesting that altruistic preferences can be induced by making
individuals reect on the importance of contributing to a public good such as blood
donation.
2.2 Blood Donation and Incentives
In his famous work, Titmuss (1971) reported evidence that nonmarket mechanisms
for blood donation are not only ethically superior but also more e¢ cient. Indeed,
according to Titmuss, hepatitis rates from blood transfusions signicantly decreased
when the blood was donated rather than purchased. This was explained by the fact
that donors who are not paid for blood have no incentive to hide an illness, which leads
to a higher quality of blood in such systems. Moreover, a nancial reimbursement for
blood donation could induce those who are more in needof money to oversupply,
eliciting a new supply from non-altruistic individuals, who are in turn likely to
be less healthy. Reimbursement for blood would reduce the altruistic motivations
behind individualsblood donation behaviour, producing a decline in supply from
those individuals, i.e. crowd-out. As mentioned, this seminal work prompted Arrows
(1972) and Solows (1971) responses questioning the substitution of altruists by non-
altruists in line with Cooper and Culyers (1968) arguments. Kessel (1974) added
that market mechanisms could provide guarantees for blood quality if accompanied
by screening techniques to ensure product accountability. Interestingly, Thorne (2000)
argued that with more e¤ective exhortation, a donor system is capable of procuring
more organs at lower costs than market procurement. More recently, Andreoni et al.
(2008, p. 134) argued that having a personal identity as an altruist might necessarily
precede altruistic actsand that the use of monetary rewards would conict with such
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identity and hence have unintended e¤ect on individualsaltruistic motivations.
It is worth mentioning, albeit briey, that a string of theoretical papers discussing
signalling models and crowding out have also touched upon the subject of donation.
These papers discuss how individuals engage in civic activities to signal altruism.
The introduction of monetary incentives may make signalling more di¢ cult and thus
cause crowding out (Seabright, 2004; Benabou and Tirole, 2006).
There are very few empirical tests of Titmussclaim but there exists some liter-
ature about counter-productivity of monetary incentives for other situations (Gneezy
and Rustichini, 2000a, 2000b; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006). Drawing
on Benabou and Tirole (2006), Ariely et al. (2009) model image motivation or the
desire to be liked and well-regarded by others as a driver in prosocial behavior and
analyse whether extrinsic monetary incentives have a detrimental e¤ect on proso-
cial behavior due to the crowding out of image. They show and test this with an
experiment that monetary incentives crowd out image motivation.
The empirical papers most directly related to our current paper are Mellstrom
and Johannesson (2008), Goette and Stutzer (2008), Wildman and Hollingsworth
(2009), Lacetera and Macis (2010a and 2010b) and Glynn et al. (2003). Mellstrom
and Johannesson test Titmussproposition using a eld experiment with three groups
of individuals: blood donors who receive monetary compensation, those who receive
no compensation at all, and those who receive monetary compensation given directly
to a charity. Introducing compensation is found to crowd out only female blood
donors. Importantly, when charitable motivation is introduced, crowding out disap-
pears. Goette and Stutzer (2008) nd that o¤ering lottery tickets to donors increases
the turnout at blood drives among infrequent donors, but there are no e¤ects among
frequent donors. Glynn et al. (2003) surveyed 45,588 US blood donors on their atti-
tudes towards incentives for blood donation. They found that giving blood credits,
cholesterol screening and prostate-specic antigen screening encourage donation and
that 7 to 9 per cent of donors reported that compensatory incentives would have
the opposite e¤ect. Lacetera and Macis (2010a) exploit a longitudinal dataset on
all donors in one Italian town and nd that publicly announcing symbolic prizes
for donors achieving certain quotas encouraged frequency of donation. Their results
suggest that social image concerns may be a very important promoter of prosocial
behaviour. In another paper, Lacetera and Macis (2010b) use a subsample of that
population to answer a survey on attitudes towards di¤erent types of compensation.
5
They nd that whilst cash payments would reduce donations especially among women
and older donors, an equivalent amount in the form of vouchers would not. Lastly,
Wildman and Hollingsworth (2009) examine the type and timing of blood donations
between new and established donors and nd a systematic di¤erence between the two
groups. Whilst new donors are sensitive to incentives, established donorsbehaviour
is driven primarily by social norms.
Most of the empirical studies suggest that crowding out is specic of the particular
settings individuals are in. Thus, we advocate that extrinsic motivation or rewards
for blood donation may take di¤erent meanings within each countrys di¤erent social
norms, and hence we should expect di¤erential levels of crowding out by country.
Furthermore, not all rewards may crowd out an individuals identity as an altruist
(or a donor).
For the purpose of motivating our empirical specication, we conclude this section
by suggesting that the e¤ect of monetary incentives on blood supply can be modeled
by drawing on the concept of donor identity. Assume that blood donated enters an
individuals utility function, U(), by two means: positively through the (warm glow)
e¤ect that it has on her self-image or self-identity I(:) as a donor, a gift-giver or
an altruist, and negatively as a direct consequence of the inconveniences associated
with donating blood. Also, monetary incentives for blood donation, r(a), increase
the income of the donor but a¤ect negatively the donors self-image or self-identity
(@I
@r
 0). The individual maximizes utility:
U = U(a; c; I;D) (1)
such that self-image I is
I = I(a; r(a); E;D) (2)
subject to the budget constraint
pc = v + r(a)a (3)
where a is the intensity of blood donation, c is a composite commodity with price p,
I is self-identity, D is a vector containing individual demographic characteristics and
the individual social environment, E represents other environmental factors which
include social norms, v is the wealth of the individual, and r(a) is the monetary
incentive given for blood donation. The (rearranged) rst-order condition for the
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maximisation problem of this simplied image caring individual is
@U
@a
 
+
@U
@I
+
@I
@a
+| {z }
+
+ r0(a)
+
(
+
+
@U
@I
+
@I
@r
 | {z }
 
) = 0: (4)
Assuming concavity of utility function with respect to a, the rst-order condition
above illustrates how a negative e¤ect on self-identity from receiving a monetary
reward for blood donation will decrease the optimal amount of donation.1 Note that
if the rewards to blood donation are not monetary, er(a) and the utility function
depends positively on them, @U
@er(a) > 0, the e¤ect on blood donation is ambiguous
as the associated rst-order condition is @U
@a
+ @U
@I
@I
@a
+ @U
@er er0(a) = 0, and, thus the
comparison between a and a will depend on the relative magnitudes of @U
@er and ,
which we cannot establish a priori.
In the next section, we describe our dataset and later we explain our empirical
approach to test whether monetary and nonmonetary incentives are negatively asso-
ciated with blood donation.
3 Data and Sample
We use data from the 2002 Eurobarometer (58.2), a survey covering fteen European
countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
The survey contains information on socio-demographic characteristics of the respond-
ents, and health and attitudes towards risk. In particular, among other subjects, this
issue of the Eurobarometer survey gathered information not only on blood donation
but also on the respondentsviews on blood and organ donation. We use the answers
to the following questions:
The rst question (Q59) is on blood donation and it is phrased as Have you
donated in the past? This question can be answered with a Yes or No. The
1Without the negative e¤ect of monetary rewards for donation on self-identity (@U@I
@I
@r = 0),
the optimal amount of blood supply a satises @U@I
@I
@a +
@U
@a + r
0(a) = 0: But if @U@I
@I
@r < 0,
the optimum, a; satises the rst order condition in (4) instead, i.e. at a the following is
satised: @U@I
@I
@a +
@U
@a + r
0(a) =  r0(a)@U@I @I@r > 0; which means that the objective function
@U
@I
@I
@a +
@U
@a +r
0(a) has a positive gradient evaluated at a. Thus, a lies to the left of the original
optimum a; i.e., it is smaller.
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second question (Q60), on attitudes towards rewards for blood donation, asks In
your opinion, should someone who gives blood ...?The possible answers were:
 receive a xed fee of:
 10 Euros (Yes/No)
 25 Euros (Yes/No)
 100 Euros (Yes/No).
 be allowed to do so during working hours (Yes/No)
 be reimbursed for the expenses incurred (Yes/No)
 receive a small non-monetary gift (Yes/No)
 not receive anything (Yes/No)
As reported in Table 1, about 35 per cent of our sample of 8,821 European indi-
viduals have donated blood. Looking at the blood donors column, we observe that
86 per cent of donors do not think donors should be rewarded with a monetary com-
pensation, while fourteen per cent believe they should. Eighty-two per cent of the
non-donors think money should not be provided for blood donation and eighteen per
cent believe it should. These percentages are all signicantly di¤erent at the ve per
cent level.
In Figure 1 we plot the percentages of donors and non-donors who believe that
e10, e25, and e100 should be given for blood donation. The graph shows negatively
sloped o¤er curves for both donors and non-donors, i.e., the higher the price o¤ered,
the less people chose it as the right answer. Most signicantly, the non-donorscurve
appears to the right of that for the donors.
Table 2 displays a further summary of responses to these key questions by the
respondentssocio-demographic characteristics and by their choices with regards to
monetary versus non-monetary rewards. We notice from column one that more males
have donated blood than females have (forty-one versus thirty per cent). Also, those
living in Nordic European countries are more likely to have given blood than those in
Central Europe (thirty-six per cent versus thirty-ve per cent), the latter being more
likely to have donated blood than the Mediterranean countries (thirty-four per cent).
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The second group of columns show that eighteen per cent of the male respondents
believe that monetary rewards should be given to donors and their reservation price
(average amount) is e30.06. Sixteen per cent of females believe money should be
o¤ered and the average amount is very similar (e29.06). The regional di¤erences
in this table are remarkable. Although the Mediterranean countries have a similar
percentage of donors to those of North and Central Europe (34 to 36 per cent), fewer
Mediterranean individuals are in favour of monetary rewards for blood donation (six
per cent as opposed to fteen and twenty-ve per cent), but on average they choose
higher monetary rewards for donation with an average of e52.77 as opposed to
e23.78 and e28.29, respectively. These regional di¤erences with respect to attitudes
towards rewards could be explained by the levels of income per capita and/or the levels
of social capital and trust in the institutions, although a more rened multivariate
analysis is required to explore the di¤erences behind these bivariate frequencies.
Finally, in the last column we report the percentages of those choosing non-
monetary rewards for blood donation: sixty-seven per cent of males agree with a
non-monetary reward, while sixty-nine per cent of females do so. The percentages of
Mediterranean, Nordic and Central European respondents who choose non-monetary
rewards are sixty, seventy-eight and sixty-six, respectively. The row at the bottom
of Table 2 summarizes the information broken down above for the aggregate, i.e.,
thirty-ve per cent of the sample have donated blood, the average reward for the
seventeen per cent favouring monetary rewards is e29.55, and 68 per cent of the full
sample are in favour of non-monetary rewards.
Table 3 presents denitions and sample statistics of the variables used in the
empirical analysis. Besides, the table includes two key variables: The percentages of
the sample who considered that blood transfusion less, asor moresafe in 2002
than in 1992 (14, 20 and 66 per cent, respectively) as this may be an important
determinant of the decision to donate blood. And, the answer to the question on
how much concern others show towards oneselfbecause we believe it may capture
how much solidarity the respondent perceives in her/his environment, and that could
inuence altruistic tendencies. Five per cent of our sample felt other people do not
show concern about what they are doing, fourteen per cent thought other people
show little concern, forty-seven per cent felt that other people show some concern,
and thirty-four per cent declared others showed a lot of concern.
In the next section, we describe our empirical approach to addressing the questions
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of interest.
4 Empirical Strategy: A Recursive Equation Sys-
tem
Our empirical approach relies on two hypotheses. First, there are unobserved in-
dividual characteristics such as altruism and family history that inuence both the
decision of donating blood and the views on rewarding blood donation. Thus, the
error terms of equations trying to explain having donated blood and beliefs on re-
warding blood donation with money or other rewards will be correlated. Second,
beyond that unobserved correlation, individual preferences towards rewards for blood
donation may have a direct inuence on the likelihood of having donated blood but
not vice versa.2 Accordingly, to answer the question of whether being in favour of
monetary/non-monetary rewards is related to having donated blood, we estimate two
recursive systems: one for donation and monetary reward, and the other for donation
and other reward. The system for binary blood donation (y1) and binary reward (y2)
is characterized by the structural equations for the corresponding latent variables (y1
and y2):
y1 = y

2 + x
01 + z012 + u1 (5)
y2 = x
01 + z
0
22 + u2 (6)
In equations (5) and (6), the error terms [u1; u2]0 are assumed to be distributed
as bivariate normal with zero means, unitary variances, and correlation  1    1;
the variances are assumed to be unitary because observed outcomes for y1 and y2 are
both binary.
Vectors x; z1; and z2 are observed individual traits such that x a¤ects both blood
donation and reward, z1 determines donation only, and z2 determines reward only; to-
gether, these variables constitute the individual demographics (D) and environmental
factors (E) which enter the utility function (equations (1) and (2)).
The reduced form equation system constitutes equation (6) and
y1 = x
0(1 + 1) + z
0
12 + z
0
2(2) + u

1 (7)
2We estimated alternative specications in which donation is allowed to a¤ect the likelihood of
favouring monetary (and non-monetary) rewards. The e¤ect was found to be insignicant, which
o¤ers empirical support for our specication of a recursive system.
10
where the composite error term u1 = u1 + u2, and the error vector [u

1; u2]
0 is dis-
tributed as bivariate normal with zero means, nite variances [!21; 1]
0, and correlation
 = (+ )=!1; where !21 = 1 + 2 + 
2:3 Based on the reduced form equations (7)
and (6), binary donation and reward are characterized by
yi = 1 if yi > 0
= 0 if yi  0; i = 1; 2: (8)
To allow for the fact that countries from di¤erent regions may have very di¤erent
ethnic, cultural and social backgrounds, di¤erent levels of social capital and trust in
the institutions, as well as blood collection habits and infrastructures, we also estimate
a model in which country dummy variables are interacted with latent reward (y2 ) in
equation (5). This amounts to making the coe¢ cient  of the latent reward a function
of regional dummy variables d with parameter vector :
 = d0: (9)
To simplify notations, express the deterministic components on the right-hand
sides of the reduced forms (7) and (6) as h01 and h
02, respectively, where h =
[x0; z01; z
0
2]
0 is the concatenated variable vector and 1 and 2 are conformable para-
meter vectors which are functions of the structural parameters in equations (5) and
(6). Then, the sample likelihood function is similar to that of a bivariate probit
model:
L =
Y
all
2 (1h
01=!1; 2h
02; 12) (10)
where 1 = 2y1   1 and 2 = 2y2   1 are dichotomous indicators, 2 is the standard
bivariate normal cumulative distribution function, and allindicates multiplication
over all sample observations.
4.1 Identication Strategy
Unique variables z1 in the donation equation (5) and z2 in the reward equation (6)
serve to identify the model parameters (also see (7)).
3Note that by specifying a distribution for the error terms of the structural equations (5) and (6),
rather than for the error terms of the reduced forms (7) and (6) as in Maddala (1983, p. 246), the
composite error term u1 depends on error terms (u1 and u2) of both structural equations, leading
to a covariance structure which accommodates heterogeneity in the reduced form in equation (7) for
donation.
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Common explanatory variables for both processes (x) are age, gender, education,
marital status and country of origin. As variables that explain the donation decision
but not beliefs about rewards for blood donation (z1), we include those related to
individual health (self assessed health, having a long standing illness, exercise), the
type of dwelling where the respondant lives   as it may reect accessibility to blood
donation infrastructure; whether the individual perceives donation to be safer or not
than ten years ago; and whether or not the respondant feels concern from others -
possibly capturing the individuals perceived level of othersaltruism. As variables
explaining beliefs towards monetary and non-monetary rewards for donation but not
the donation decision per se (z2), we have included the income of the individual and
whether he is employed, self-employed or out of work. As noted below, the use of z1
in the donation equation and z2 in the reward equation are justied by Wald tests
for their joint signicance.
We present the results in the next section and discuss them in the following section.
5 Results
We rst present estimates of the having donated blood equation. Secondly, we
provide country specic estimates of the coe¢ cient associated with being in favour of
monetary rewards and of non-monetary rewards.
Table 4 presents results for the recursive systems of having been a donor, and
being in favour of monetary rewards and non-monetary rewards for blood donation,
respectively. The top panel contains estimates for the system in which being in favour
of monetary rewards is considered. The bottom panel presents the results for being
in favour of a non-monetary rewards system. The rst column in each specication
reports estimates for the donation equation and the second column for the reward
equation. We present the results starting with the most parsimonious specication
and move on to specications with an increasing number of controls. This is done to
illustrate the robustness of the main coe¢ cients of interest.
For both models, when estimating the probability of having donated, the rst
specication controls for self-assessed health, having a chronic illness, and gender;
the second specication adds age and level of education; the third includes marital
status and the level of urbanisation (rural, village, urban). The fourth specication
additionally controls for country of origin and, nally, model eadds to that the level
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of physical activity and the individuals perceived solidarity towards oneself, viz.,
perceived degree of concern from others. When estimating the likelihood of being
in favour of a particular type of reward for blood donation, the rst specication
controls for gender and income; the second incorporates employment status, age and
education; the third adds marital status; and the fourth and fth additionally control
for country of origin. In sum, in the benchmark specication, the blood donation
equation identifying variables, z1, are those related to health, physical activity, belief
that blood donation is safer, type of dwelling, and perceived concern from others. The
variables that identify the rewards equation, z2, are income and employment status.
On favouring monetary rewards for donation, the top row of the top panel contains
the coe¢ cients associated with being in favour of monetary rewards in the equation
explaining the probability of having donated blood for the di¤erent specications. The
coe¢ cient is  0:593 and signicant at the 95 per cent level of condence for the rst
and most parsimonious specication. This coe¢ cient becomes  0:784 and signicant
at the 99 per cent level of condence in the second specication and remains very
close in magnitude to those in subsequent specications (i.e., taking values  0:793,
 0:760 and  0:762). This coe¢ cient is robust to di¤erent specications and thus
establishes the negative association between being in favour of monetary rewards for
blood donation and the likelihood of having donated blood hints at the crowding out
e¤ect of paying for blood donation. That is, donors are less likely to favour monetary
compensation for donation than non-donors.
The bottom panel of Table 4 contains estimates for the donation-non-monetary
system. The rst row shows the coe¢ cients associated with believing that non-
monetary rewards for blood donation should be provided in the equation explaining
the probability of having donated blood in the di¤erent specications (from left to
right). The coe¢ cient is 0:052 and insignicant for the rst specication; it remains
insignicant and around 0:05 for the next two specications, which do not control
for countries of origin. When countries of origin are incorporated in the fourth and
fth specications, the coe¢ cient becomes about 0:3 and signicant at the 95 per
cent level of condence. Although this coe¢ cient is not as robust as that associated
with believing in monetary rewards, these estimates suggest that those in favour of
non-monetary rewards are less likely to have donated blood. The estimates for our
benchmark (last) model can be found in Table 5. We briey summarize the most
interesting and signicant results. Looking at the estimates for the recursive system
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of donation and monetary rewards in Table 5, we notice that, the use of the aforemen-
tioned identication variables are justied by their joint signicance in the donation
equation (Wald = 20:43, df = 12, p-value = 0:059) and money reward equation (Wald
= 15:61, df = 3, p-value = 0:003). In addition, as expected, believing that donating
blood is much safer than before is associated with a higher likelihood of donation,
as are age, education level, gender (being male) and, surprisingly, widowhood. The
positive coe¢ cient of being male may be explained by physical reasons, viz., donors
have to be above a certain body weight, and pregnancy, breast-feeding and anaemia
are not conducive to blood donation. With respect to the likelihood of favouring
monetary rewards, we observe that being employed and self-employed (as opposed to
unemployed) have a negative e¤ect, as do age and being divorced. Income, having
been in the education system until 20 years of age, and being male have a positive
coe¢ cient.
For the recursive system of donation and non-monetary rewards indicate that, the
use of the identication variables are again justied by their joint signicance in the
donation equation (Wald = 33:51, df = 12, p-value = 0:001) and reward equation
(Wald = 31:98, df = 3, p-value < 0:001). Results also suggest that again, being male,
belief that blood donation has become safer, age, and education also have positive
impacts on the donation equation, while widowhood is now negatively correlated with
donation. With respect to the likelihood of favouring non-monetary rewards, we nd
that being employed has a positive coe¢ cient while being self-employed and being a
widow have negative e¤ects.
Controlling for countries of origin has an important e¤ect on the coe¢ cients of
interest. This is expected because of the di¤erent country-specic infrastructures for
collecting blood, ethnicity, cultures and levels of social capital. For that reason,
we estimate a modication of the benchmark model above by interacting latent
rewards with country dummy variables, as described in (9). Table 6 displays the
country-specic coe¢ cients for the association between believing in (monetary and
non-monetary) rewards for blood donation and actually having donated. The most
remarkable conclusion from the country analysis is that all countries show a similar
negative association between believing in monetary rewards and donation, and thus,
monetary rewards for blood donation could potentially mean a crowd out of blood
supply of similar magnitudes. The second notable nding is that the positive coe¢ -
cient of non-monetary reward obtained without the country dummy interactions does
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not hold for any country except for Austria, with a coe¢ cient of 0:348 which is sig-
nicant at the 99 per cent condence level. Most interestingly, for Italy and Sweden,
the coe¢ cient is negative but only signicant at the 90 per cent condence level. For
the remaining countries, the association is not signicant. In the next section we
discuss these results and conclude.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper analyses the question of whether o¤ering monetary rewards for blood
donation might crowd out blood supply, as well as whether non-monetary rewards
would have the same e¤ect. We examine these questions drawing on a large sur-
vey representative of individuals in fteen European countries containing individual
information on blood donation and preferences for monetary and non-monetary re-
wards for blood donation. Our results indicate that those who believe that monetary
rewards should be given for blood donation are less likely to have donated blood,
while those favouring non-monetary rewards instead are equally or more likely to
have donated blood.
Although our data do not contain information on intensity of donations, we in-
terpret the negative association between favouring monetary rewards and the actual
donation of blood as indicative of the negative e¤ect of cash for blood on the altru-
istic individuals identity. Using a stylised theoretical model, we show that a negative
e¤ect of monetary rewards on the altruistic individuals identity would result in less
intensity of donations but non-monetary results would not necessarily lead to this
outcome. Thus, our results suggest that o¤ering monetary rewards for blood dona-
tion might indeed crowd out blood supply as the altruistic individual do not favour
monetary rewards. Our results also indicate, however, that there would be no supply
displacement of altruistic donors if non-monetary rewards were o¤ered instead. Thus,
non-monetary rewards could potentially be used to incentivise blood donation as this
kind of rewards seems not to remove, in the terminology of Andreoni et al. (2008),
the warm-glow associated with blood giving. Our ndings contribute interestingly to
the existing body of literature using experimental results of Mellstrom and Johan-
nesson (2008) and Lacetera and Macis (2010b); and, the results of Lacetera and Macis
(2010a) and Glynn et al. (2003) using donorsdatasets. Our analysis further conrms
their ndings by providing additional empirical evidence obtained using information
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on the preferences of both donors and non-donors.
We also nd strong evidence of gender di¤erences. First of all, males are more
likely to be donors, more likely to favour monetary rewards, but not more likely to
be in favour of non-monetary rewards. As noted earlier, males may be more likely to
be donors for physical reasons (e.g., higher body weight, absence of pregnancy and
lactation period, and lower likelihood of being anaemic). Other explanations include
the fact that some countries organise blood drives to factories and other places with
a higher percentage of males and even motivate very strongly those in the military
service to give blood as is the case in Austria.4
Another remarkable nding of this paper is that although we conrm that country
of origin is a very signicant source of variation, a more detailed analysis at the
country level reveals that the association of favouring monetary rewards and blood
donation is uniformly negative and very signicant across all countries. Nevertheless,
the country coe¢ cients for the association between non-monetary rewards and blood
donation is much more heterogeneous, with Austria showing a strongly positive and
signicant sign but Italy and Sweden showing the opposite.
While this paper presents one of the rst attempts at investigating the crowding
out issue using large multi-country survey data from Europe containing not only
observational data but also attitudinal information on donors and non-donors, a few
caveats pertain. First, our data come from a cross sectional database which, while
large and representative of fteen European countries, imposes important restrictions
on the interpretation of the results. Also, the denition of a donor in the data is
very wide one and includes any person that has ever donated blood. Therefore, we
can suitably measure donor identity but not intensity of blood donation as we cannot
distinguish regular from non-regular donors. Further, our analysis seeks to establish
associations between individual information related to beliefs(being in favour of a
type of reward for blood donation) with an act realisation(having donated blood).
The hypothetical nature of the stated beliefsmay therefore weaken the argument we
are trying to make. Finally, we choose to allow favouring of rewards to have a direct
association with being a donor but not vice versa. While bad experiences donating
blood could a¤ect beliefs about rewarding for blood donation (to compensate for
4In Austria there is an agreement between the army and the Red Cross. The army motivates
blood donation by allowing donors to leave for the weekend earlier on the Friday after blood donation
and the Red Cross provides the blood group test for free (Fiala, 1997).
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pain, for instance), this seems implausible and statistical test during our preliminary
analysis did not support the reverse causality of donation on beliefs (see footnote 2).
Our results suggest that altruistic actions may be incentivised as long as the in-
centives do not interfere with the self-identity/image of the individual as a donor.
Thus, to deal with blood shortages, policies geared towards the provision of non-
monetary incentives could be implemented. This is compatible with the notion of
nudging behaviour to full a wider social policy objective. That is, altruistic beha-
viour could be motivated by non-monetary means and thus nudge individuals to act
in a manner that provides collective benet.
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Table 1
Frequencies of Preferences Towards Rewards
Donors Non-donors Full sample
35% 65% 100%
Monetary reward
No 86% 82% 83%
Yes 14% 18% 17%
Other reward
No 33% 32% 32%
Yes 67% 68% 68%
Note: All di¤erences are signicant at the 5% signicance level.
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Table 2
Donation and Rewards by Gender and Geographic Area
% that Monetary reward Non-monetary
have donated Mean amount among reward:
blood % favouring those favouring (e) % favouring
Gender
Male 41:30 17:52 30:06 67:22
(30:51)
Female 29:63 15:83 29:06 68:53
(30:61)
Area
Mediterranean 33:71 6:05 52:77 59:69
(41:72)
Nordic 36:07 15:43 23:78 77:97
(25:08)
Central Europe 35:26 25:37 28:29 65:90
(28:82)
Full sample 35:06 16:62 29:55 67:92
(30:56)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 3
Denitions and Sample Statistics of Explanatory Variables
Variable Denition Mean
Continuous explanatory variables
Age Age in years 45:72
(17:28)
Income Total wages and salaries per month, including 13971:40
pensions, child benets, and other rents (3315:13)
Vigorous activity Vigorous physical activity (minutes/week) 101:91
(173:56)
Among those who exercise vigorously (39:59% 257:42
of sample) (189:91)
Binary explanatory variables (yes = 1; no = 0)
Male Gender is male 0:47
Education
Education 1 Finished full-time education when age < 15 (ref.) 0:24
Education 2 Finished full-time education when 16  age  19 0:38
Education 3 Finished full-time education when age  20 0:29
Education 4 Still studying 0:08
Marital status
Unmarried Unmarried or separated (ref.) 0:31
Married Married 0:52
Divorced Divorced 0:09
Widowed Widowed 0:08
Dwelling
Village Living in rural area or village 0:34
Town Living in small or middle-sized town 0:34
City Living in large town (ref.) 0:32
Employment
Employed Currently employed 0:47
Self-employed Currently self-employed 0:07
Not working Currently not working (ref.) 0:46
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Table 3
(Continued)
Self-assessed health
Health very bad Self-assessed health (SAH) is very bad or bad (ref.) 0.06
Health fair SAH is fair 0.25
Health good SAH is good 0.43
Health very good SAH is very good 0.26
Standing illness Su¤ering from long-standing illness 0.29
Safety in blood donation
Less safe Blood transfusion less safe than 10 years ago (ref.) 0.14
As safe Blood transfusion as safe as 10 years ago 0.20
Safer Blood transfusion safer than 10 years ago 0.66
Concern from others
No concern Receive no concern (from others) 0.05
Little concern Receive little concern 0.14
Some concern Receive some concern 0.47
Lots of concern Receive lots of concern 0.34
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. For households who did not respond to
the income question, we imputed income based on age, sex, marital status, education,
health and number of members in the family. The term (ref) indicates that that
category has been used as reference in the estimation (omitted category).
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Simultaneous Equation Model of Donation and Beliefs towards Rewards (Pooled Sample)
Variable Coeff S.E. Coeff Coeff S.E. Coeff Coeff S.E. Coeff Coeff S.E. Coeff Coeff S.E. Coeff
Reward -0.593 0.295 ** -0.784 0.092 *** -0.793 0.087 *** -0.760 0.120 *** -0.762 0.119 ***
Constant
Health
Chronic Illness
Physical Activity
Safety
Income 
Employment Status
Gender
Age
Education
Marital Status
Dwelling
Perceived Solidarity
Control countries
Error corr. (rho) 0.489 0.316 0.704 0.103 *** 0.712 0.099 *** 0.654 0.136 *** 0.658 0.135 ***
Variable Coeff S.E. Coeff Coeff S.E. Coeff Coeff S.E. Coeff Coeff S.E. Coeff Coeff S.E. Coeff
Reward 0.052 9.940 0.048 0.125 0.0559 0.128 0.322 0.149 ** 0.352 0.151 **
Constant
Health
Chronic Illness
Physical Activity
Safety
Income 
Employment Status
Gender
Age
Education
Marital Status
Dwelling
Perceived Solidarity
Control countries
Error corr. (rho) -0.060 9.936 -0.068 0.126 -0.075 0.129 -0.332 0.149 ** -0.3631 0.1508 **
Significance at 1% is indicated with ***, at 5% with ** and at 10% with *. 
Donate Non-Monetary Rewards Donate
Non-Monetary 
Rewards Donate
Model a Model b Model c Model d
Donate Non-Monetary Rewards
YES YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES
Donate Monetary Rewards Donate Monetary Rewards Donate
Table 4
Model a Model b Model c Model d Model e
Donate Monetary Rewards Donate Monetary Rewards
S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E.
Monetary Rewards
YES YES YES YES YES
YES
YES
YES YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES YES YES
YES YES
YES
YES
YES YES
Donate Non-Monetary Rewards
S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E.
Non-Monetary 
Rewards
Model e
YES YES YES YES
NO NO NO YES
YES YES
YES YES YES
YES
YES YES
YES
YES
YES YES YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES YES
YES YES
YES YESYES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES YESYES YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES
YES YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES
YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES YES
YES
NO NO NO YES YES
YES YES YES
YES
YES
YES YES YES YES YESYES YES YES YESYES
YES
YES
YES YES
Table 5
Maximum-Likelihood Estimates of Recursive Equation Systems
Monetary Non-monetary
Variable Donation reward Donation reward
Reward  0:762 0:352
(0:119) (0:151)
Health fair  0:058  0:052
(0:051) (0:062)
Health good  0:017 0:0007
(0:053) (0:065)
Health very good 0:017 0:043
(0:057) (0:070)
Vigorous activity 0:010 0:013
(0:007) (0:008)
Standing illness 0:002  0:013
(0:029) (0:035)
As safe 0:002 0:025
(0:039) (0:048)
Safer 0:125 0:170
(0:039) (0:043)
Income / 1000 0:009 0:0001
(0:005) (0:006)
Employed  0:180 0:159
(0:046) (0:037)
Self-employed  0:198  0:114
(0:065) (0:061)
Male 0:363 0:178 0:301  0:043
(0:041) (0:038) (0:032) (0:030)
Age / 10 0:042  0:038 0:090  0:0004
(0:117) (0:016) (0:012) (0:013)
Education 2 0:363 0:178 0:272  0:012
(0:041) (0:038) (0:044) (0:041)
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Table 5
(Continued)
Monetary Non-monetary
Variable Donation reward Donation reward
Education 3 0:175  0:024 0:357 0:006
(0:060) (0:053) (0:052) (0:045)
Education 4 0:251  0:023  0:032  0:106
(0:073) (0:057) (0:084) (0:075)
Married  0:043  0:026 0:004  0:037
(0:090) (0:092) (0:038) (0:038)
Divorced  0:034  0:102  0:002 0:002
(0:049) (0:048) (0:057) (0:059)
Widowed 0:148  0:006  0:155  0:124
(0:071) (0:071) (0:077) (0:071)
Village  0:054  0:030
(0:030) (0:035)
Town  0:031  0:018
(0:029) (0:034)
Little concern  0:061  0:074
(0:057) (0:069)
Some concern  0:056  0:061
(0:052) (0:063)
Lots of concern  0:048  0:049
(0:053) (0:065)
Constant  1:780  1:341  1:236 0:668
(0:141) (0:128) (0:142) (0:116)
Countries controled Yes Yes
Error corr. 0:658  0:363
(0:135) (0:151)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks *** indicate
statistical signicance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10%
level.
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Table 6
Country-Specic Association Between Rewards and Donation
Donation-money reward Donation-other reward
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Greece  0:907*** 0:086  0:019 0:131
Belgium  0:619*** 0:132  0:155 0:142
Denmark  0:835*** 0:097  0:008 0:122
W. Germany  0:791*** 0:100 0:004 0:131
Italy  0:598*** 0:131  0:244* 0:143
Spain  0:782*** 0:104 0:051 0:138
France  0:893*** 0:084 0:053 0:128
Ireland  0:907*** 0:090  0:003 0:143
N. Ireland  0:931*** 0:098 0:160 0:156
Luxembourg  0:679*** 0:126  0:114 0:139
Netherlands  0:676*** 0:121  0:195 0:132
Portugal  0:726*** 0:119  0:101 0:134
Britain  0:839*** 0:090 0:130 0:137
E. Germany  0:740*** 0:112 0:061 0:130
Finland  0:878*** 0:087 0:082 0:126
Sweden  0:700*** 0:118  0:234* 0:123
Austria  1:175*** 0:058 0:348*** 0:132
Note: Asterisks *** indicate statistical signicance at the 1% level
and * at the 10% level.
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Figure 1 : Percentage of donors and non-donors choosing positive 
quantities as rewards for donating blood
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